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Economically Inactive EU Migrants and the UK’s NHS: Unreasonable Burdens without Real Links? 
Sylvia de Mars* 
Abstract 
Under pressure to make healthcare provision more affordable, questions of access to healthcare have 
gained prominence in most countries in recent years.  In light of these concerns, this article examines 
a grey area of EU law: can economically inactive EU migrants rely on entitlement to the UK’s NHS to 
satisfy Directive 2004/38/EC’s requirement for them to have “comprehensive sickness insurance”?  In 
particular, it considers if the UK can rely on the EU law concepts of “unreasonable burden” or “real 
link” to restrict economically inactive EU citizens’ access to the NHS.  It finds that that neither concept 
effectively prevents those who are not “contributing” to public finances from accessing publicly 
funded healthcare.  The article concludes by recommending EU-level coordination of responsibility for 
social security coverage in order to ensure that universal, residency-based healthcare systems like the 
NHS remain sustainable in a post-citizenship EU. 
Introduction 
As the sustainability of public services in most Member States has become an increasingly fraught 
political issue in the last decades,1 numerous Member States have reconsidered their domestic rules 
governing access to public services, including health care services.2  In the UK, the immigration 
                                                          
*Lecturer in Law, Newcastle Law School.  My thanks go to Ole Pedersen and Ian Ward and the anonymous 
reviewer for their comments on earlier drafts of this piece; the usual disclaimer applies. 
1 See, on health care in particular, Tamara K. Hervey, “The European Union's Governance of Health Care and 
the Welfare Modernization Agenda” (2008) 2 Regulation and Governance 103; Gareth Davies, “The 
Community's Internal Market-Based Competence to Regulate Healthcare: Scope, Strategies and 
Consequences” (2007) 14 M.J. 215, p. 217. 
2 This holds true for both countries that operate social insurance systems (see, inter alia, Pauline Rosenau and 
Christiaan Lako, “An Experiment with Regulated Competition and Individual Mandates for Universal Health 
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authorities have in recent years attempted to curb economically inactive migrants’ reliance on the 
NHS3, in an effort to—as Theresa May put it in 2012—prevent “abuse” of the generous UK 
healthcare system.4  In an EU context, such “abuse” takes the form of economically inactive EU 
citizen migrants relying on host State services, when their free movement rights (stemming from art. 
20 and 21 TFEU, and further articulated in Directive 2004/38/EC, or the Citizens’ Directive) are 
contingent on them having sufficient resources and comprehensive sickness insurance so as to not 
burden host State finances.5 
Unfortunately, curbing EU citizens’ access to the NHS is not a straight-forward exercise, as the 
Citizens’ Directive also contains an obligation to extend equal treatment to all migrant EU citizens.  
Consequently, as long as economically inactive British nationals are entitled to access the NHS when 
they reside in the UK, EU nationals in equivalent circumstances generally are as well.  There are only 
two recognized means to preclude economically inactive migrant EU citizens from relying on 
healthcare services like the NHS without violating EU law.  Per the case law of the ECJ, Member 
States are exempt from extending equal treatment under the Citizens’ Directive where migrant EU 
citizens fail to demonstrate a “real link” to the host State.  Alternatively, where an EU migrant is 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Care: The New Dutch Health Insurance System” (2008) 33 J.H.P.P.L. 1031) and countries that operate national 
health services (see, for instance, Maija Sakslin, “The Concept of Residence and Social Security: Reflections on 
Finnish, Swedish and Community Legislation” (2000) 2 E.J.M.L. 157). 
3 The “NHS” is used here as a collective term for the English, Welsh, Northern Irish and Scottish national health 
services; while independent, in regulating patient access they operate under identical legal principles (see fn. 
28). 
4 Alex Barker, "Britain falls foul of Brussels over immigration" (Financial Times, 26 April 2012). Ft.com,  
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/31fb56f8-8fca-11e1-beaa-00144feab49a.html  [Accessed April 9, 2014]. 
5 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the right of citizens 
of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States 
[2004] O.J. L158/77, art. 7. 
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found to be an “unreasonable burden” on the host State public finances, their right to reside under 
the Citizens’ Directive can be revoked.  However, what constitutes an “unreasonable burden”, or 
how a “real link” can be demonstrated, is unfortunately—after more than 20 years of case law on EU 
citizenship—still unclear. 
This article will explore the concepts of “unreasonable burden” and “real link”, using EU migrant 
access to the NHS as a case study.  First, it will outline when economically inactive EU citizens are 
permitted to exercise their art. 21 TFEU right to reside in a host Member State.  Following this, a 
brief discussion of how access to public health care is regulated at the EU level and in UK domestic 
law will lead to an examination of existing EU-compliant possibilities for preventing economically 
inactive EU migrants from using the NHS.  The article concludes that it is not clear if access to a 
residency-based universal healthcare system can be comfortably restricted using either the 
“unreasonable burden” or “real link” doctrines.  Without a solution at the EU level that allocates 
responsibility for healthcare coverage to the Member States, residency-based public healthcare 
systems that are free at the point of delivery have come under significant pressure in the post-
citizenship EU. 
 
Residency Rights for Economically Inactive EU Migrants and Access to Social Benefits 
The requirement for economically inactive EU migrants to be self-sufficient has been present since 
Directives on the free movement rights of economically inactive migrants were first proposed by the 
Council.6  The 1990s residence Directives for pensioners, students, and voluntarily unemployed EU 
nationals required their subjects to have “sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the 
                                                          
6 Proposal for a Council Directive on the right of residence for students. Proposal for a Council Directive on the 
right of residence for employees and self-employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity. 
Proposal for a Council Directive on the right of residence (1989) COM(89)275 final, art. 1. 
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social assistance system” of the host State and “sickness insurance in respect of all risks” in the host 
State.7   
As is typical of directives, the wording of these requirements is general enough so as to be adaptable 
to the specific legal situation in each Member State.  The requirement for “sickness insurance in 
respect of all risks”, however, was never clarified in secondary legislation or in guidance.  “All risks” 
was an absolute requirement, and one that ignored that national healthcare systems supplied 
different levels of coverage.  In countries where there was both basic and supplementary cover 
available, it is unclear which of these was required.8   
Uncertainty surrounding what constitutes appropriate “sickness insurance” has not diminished with 
the advent of the Citizens’ Directive.  “Comprehensive” is possibly a less stringent requirement than 
“all risks”, but it is not a significant clarification.  This remains problematic, because the requirement 
for “sickness insurance” has to be applied by national authorities in such a way so that economically 
inactive migrants and their families can demonstrate that they possess it.9    
To date, EU secondary legislation has not specified the level of coverage needed by the requirement, 
nor has the ECJ’s case law offered clarification.  In Baumbast, the ECJ confirmed that both the 
“sickness insurance” requirement and the “sufficient resources” requirement are included in the 
Directive to prevent economically inactive migrants who “become an ‘unreasonable’ burden on the 
                                                          
7 art. 1 of Council Directive 90/364/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence [1990] OJ L180/26 and 
Council Directive 93/96/EEC of 29 October 1993 on the right of residence for students [1993] OJ L317/59, art. 
1(1) of Council Directive 90/365/EEC of 28 June 1990 on the right of residence for employees and self-
employed persons who have ceased their occupational activity [1990] OJ L180/28. 
8 For instance, also covering dentistry and physical therapy, as it does in Ireland; see Sarah Thomson and Elias 
Mossialos, “Private Health Insurance and the Internal Market” in Elias Mossialos and others (eds), Health 
Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy (Cambridge: CUP, 2010). 
9 arts. 8 and 9 of the Citizens’ Directive. 
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public finances of the host Member State” from exercising a right to reside.10   Following this, the ECJ 
held that any limitations on the right to reside must be proportionate.11  In the case in question, Mr. 
Baumbast had medical insurance in Germany, but this insurance did not cover emergency care in the 
UK.  The ECJ held that denying Mr. Baumbast residency rights on this lack of coverage would be 
disproportionate.12 
Baumbast helps formulate a notion of comprehensive sickness insurance: the phrasing of the 1990s 
Directives may have demanded “insurance against all risks”, but the ECJ in Baumbast made it clear 
host States cannot require economically inactive EU migrants to demonstrate literal compliance with 
this requirement.13  It is likely that the Citizens’ Directive’s amended requirement for simply 
“comprehensive” sickness insurance is a response to this need to consider proportionality.  
However, Baumbast cannot be taken to mean that all private insurance, regardless of coverage 
levels, is “comprehensive” sickness insurance.  Complete clarity thus cannot be extracted from this 
case any more than from the amended requirement in the Citizens’ Directive. 
Only recently has the Commission offered guidance on how to interpret the requirement for 
comprehensive sickness insurance.  Section 3.2.3 of the 2009 Communication on Guidance for better 
transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC offers the following suggestions on how to 
interpret this requirement: 
“Any insurance cover, private or public, contracted in the host Member State or 
elsewhere, is acceptable in principle, as long as it provides comprehensive 
                                                          
10 Baumbast and R v Secretary of State for the Home Department (C-413/99) [2002] E.C.R. I-07091, para. 90. 
11 Baumbast [2002] E.C.R. I-07091, paras 90-91. 
12 Baumbast [2002] E.C.R. I-07091, para. 93. 
13 See also Anne Pieter van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons Within the European Community: Cross-Border 
Access To Public Benefits (Oxford: Hart, 2003), p. 262. 
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coverage and does not create a burden on the public finances of the host 
Member State.” 14  
Unfortunately, this guidance does little to resolve the uncertainty.  In fact, the second part of the 
guidance’s stated requirement —comprehensive coverage that does not create a burden on the 
public finances of the host Member State—is at best unclear.  The wording echoes recitals 10 and 16 
of the Citizens’ Directive’s preamble, which suggest that requiring economically inactive EU citizens 
to be self-sufficient is a reflection on Member State concerns that these citizens will otherwise 
simply migrate to Member States with the most generous benefits arrangements.15  However, it is 
unclear if the Commission is implying that some forms of comprehensive cover are, in fact, a burden 
on public finances of the host Member State, or if it simply means that coverage must be 
comprehensive so that a burden on the public finances of the host Member State can be avoided.  
                                                          
14  Communication on guidance for better transposition and application of Directive 2004/38/EC on the right of 
citizens of the Union and their family members to move and reside freely within the territory of the Member 
States COM(2009) 313 final. 
15 See Andrew George, “A View From the UK” (2007) 14 M.J. 213; see generally van der Mei, Free Movement of 
Persons Within the European Community: Cross-Border Access To Public Benefits (2003), pp. 12-13, 27-28; 
Siofra O'Leary, The Evolving Concept of Community Citizenship: From the Free Movement of Persons to Union 
Citizenship (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996), pp. 131-132; Kay Hailbronner, “Union Citizenship and 
Access to Social Benefits” (2005) 42 C.M.L.Rev 1245; Tamara K. Hervey, “Social Solidarity: A Buttress Against 
Internal Market Law?” in Jo Shaw (ed), Social Law and Policy in an Evolving European Union (Oxford: Hart, 
2000); Siofra O'Leary, “Solidarity and Citizenship Rights in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union” in Gráinne De Búrca (ed), EU Law and the Welfare State: in Search of Solidarity (Oxford: OUP, 2005),  p. 
64 onward; Tamara K. Hervey, “Mapping the Contours of European Union Health Law and Policy” (2002) 8 
E.P.L. 69, 77-79; Laura Nistor, Public Services and the European Union: Healthcare, Health Insurance and 
Education Services (The Hague: TCM Asser, 2011), p. 283; Jo Shaw, Nina Miller and Maria Fletcher, Getting to 
Grips with EU Citizenship: Understanding the Friction Between UK Immigration Law and EU Free Movement 
Law (Edinburgh: Edinburgh Law School Citizenship Studies, 2013), pp. 26-27. 
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The second interpretation of this requirement seems more likely in light of the Commission’s in-
progress infringement proceedings against the UK,16 to be discussed below.  However, this is not 
immediately obvious from the Communication’s wording.  What constitutes an ‘unreasonable 
burden’ is thus at the heart of any evaluation of whether an economically inactive EU citizen has 
comprehensive sickness insurance, but the Communication does not clarify how such an evaluation 
is meant to take place at the Member State level. 
In summary, though economically inactive EU citizens who are exercising their free movement rights 
have been expected to hold “sickness insurance” cover in their host Member State since 1990, the 
EU has to date failed to clarify what this requirement entails.  Before evaluating the practical 
problems this results in for national health services, the article will now briefly outline how EU law 
can affect health care provision in the Member States—both in theory and in practice. 
 
The EU Legislative Framework for the Regulation of Health Care 
Generally, Article 168(7) TFEU (ex 152 TEC) states that the EU has no competence to regulate the 
setup or financing of public health care systems in Member States; at most, under Article 168 TFEU, 
the EU can encourage Member States to cooperate in efforts to improve public health.17  However, 
                                                          
16 Commission, "Free movement: Commission asks the UK to uphold EU citizens' rights (IP/12/417)" (2012).  
Europa.eu, http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-12-417_en.htm [Accessed April 9, 2014]. 
17 See Elias Mossialos and others, “Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and 
Policy” in Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy (2010); Derrick 
Wyatt, “Community Competence to Regulate Medical Services” in Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa 
(eds), Social Welfare and EU Law (Oxford: Hart, 2005); van der Mei, Free Movement of Persons Within the 
European Community: Cross-Border Access To Public Benefits (2003), p. 228; Tamara K. Hervey and Jean V. 
McHale, Health Law and the European Union (Cambridge: CUP, 2004), Chapter 3; Ulla Neergaard, “EU Health 
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the free movement rules have frequently had a knock-on effect on what regulation of an area in 
which the EU Member States retain exclusive competence can look like in practice.   
Regarding the free movement of services, the health care systems of the Member States have had to 
adapt to ECJ jurisprudence that gave EU citizens a right to access health care in other EU Member 
States as “users” of health services.  The ECJ’s cross-border health-care case law commencing with 
Decker18 and Kohll19 eventually culminated in even the NHS being told that it must both authorize 
and reimburse cross-border treatment for patients under its ‘cover’ where treatment at home was 
not possible within a medically acceptable time in Watts.20 This line of case law has been long-
discussed in the academic literature, frequently critically so.21  The fact that the NHS had no financial 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Care Law in a Constitutional Light: Distribution of Competence, Notions of 'Solidarity', and 'Social Europe'“ in 
Johan Willem van de Gronden and others (eds), Health Care and EU Law (The Hague: TCM Asser, 2011). 
18 Nicolas Decker v Caisse de maladie des employés privés (C-120/95 ) [1998] E.C.R. I-01831 
19 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie (C-158/96) [1998] E.C.R. I-01931 
20 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for 
Health (C-372/04) [2006] E.C.R. I-04325 
21 See, inter alia, Julio Baquero Cruz, 'The Case Law of the European Court of Justice on the Mobility of 
Patients: An Assessment' in Health Care and EU Law (2011); Vassilis Hatzopoulos, 'Killing National Health and 
Insurance Systems but Healing Patients?  The European Market for Health Care Services after the Judgments 
of the ECJ in Vanbraekel and Peerbooms' (2002) 39 Common Market Law Review 683; Christopher Newdick, 
'Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing Individual Rights by Corroding Social Solidarity' 
(2006) 43 Common Market Law Review 1645; Panos Koutrakos, 'Healthcare as an Economic Service under EC 
Law' in Social Welfare and EU Law (2005); Klaus Sieveking, 'ECJ Rulings on Health Care Services and Their 
Effects on the Freedom of Cross-Border Patient Mobility in the EU' (2007) 9 European Journal of Migration and 
Law 25; Christopher Newdick, 'The ECJ, Trans-national Health Care and Social Citizenship: Accidental Death of a 
Concept' (2008) 26 Wisconsin International Law Journal 844; Johan Willem van de Gronden, 'Cross-Border 
Health Care in the EU and the Organization of the National Health Care Systems of the Member States: the 
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mechanism in place to reimburse treatment abroad given that no “payment” for treatment ever 
took place domestically was swept aside by the ECJ, which on that point simply stated that “the 
need for the Member States to reconcile the principles and broad scheme of their healthcare system 
with the requirements arising from the Community freedoms entails … a duty on the part of the 
competent authorities of a national health service, such as the NHS, to provide mechanisms for the 
reimbursement of the cost of hospital treatment in another Member State”.22   Only in 2011 have 
the Member States—after significant legislative delay—managed to orchestrate a concerted 
response, by introducing the Patients’ Rights Directive: a codification of the cross-border health-care 
rights for patients that to an extent curtails the most invasive aspects of the ECJ’s case law.23 
On the subject of free movement of persons, significant interference stems from Regulation 
883/2004, coordinating social security for migrant EU citizens so as to ensure they do not lose social 
security entitlements on relocating to another Member State.24  Regulation 883/2004 aims to ensure 
that no EU citizens are covered by two social security systems at once, and this includes 
economically inactive migrants.25  Consequently, EU migrants currently or previously engaged in 
“economic activity” are to be covered only by the legislation of the Member State where they 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Dynamics Resulting from the European Court of Justice's Decisions on Free Movement and Competition Law' 
(2008) 26 Wisconsin International Law Journal 705. 
22 Watts [2006] E.C.R. I-04325, para. 122. 
23 Vassilis Hatzopoulos and Tamara K. Hervey, 'Coming into line: the EU's Court Softens on Cross-Border Health 
Care' (2013) 8 Health Economics, Policy and Law 1; see generally, Stephane De La Rosa, 'The Directive on 
Cross-Border Healthcare or the Art of Codifying Complex Case Law' (2012) 49 Common Market Law Review 15 
24 See generally Paul Schoukens and Danny Pieters, “The Rules Within Regulation 883/2004 For Determining 
the Applicable Legislation” (2009) 11 E.J.S.S. 81. 
25 Regulation 883/2004, art. 11(1). 
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engage(d) in said activity,26 and as a residual coordinating measure, the Regulation states that all 
other EU nationals are covered by legislation of the Member State in which they reside.27 
Residence here refers to “habitual residence”, or where a migrant’s centre of interests lies.  A 
determination of where a migrant habitually resides is to be made by the host State authorities on 
the basis of factual information presented by the migrant, covering any number of aspects of the 
migrant’s life: family situation, length of stay in the host State, employment situation, activities 
engaged in (such a studying), etc.28  Migrants must be “resident” in at least one Member State for 
the coordinating system to work; and the investigation can find that an economically inactive 
migrant is “resident” in the host State, which would then be responsible for that migrant’s health 
care even where the migrant has never contributed to social security in the host State.   
As noted, the cross-border patient case law has received substantial academic attention, but the 
effect that the EU free movement of persons rule can have on the regulation of health care has not 
received much attention to date.  The remainder of this article will show how the interplay of 
Regulation 883/2004 and the Citizenship Directive can affect organisation of national health care 
setup and financing, using the NHS as a case study.  
 
The UK System of Health Care 
                                                          
26 Regulation 883/2004, art. 11(3)(a)-(d). 
27 Regulation 883/2004, art. 11(3)(e). 
28 See Regulation (EC) No 987/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 
laying down the procedure for implementing Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 on the coordination of social 
security systems [2009] OJ L284/1, art. 11, and Commission, 'Practical guide on the applicable legislation in the 
European Union (EU), the European Economic Area (EEA) and in Switzerland' (europa.eu, December 2013) 
<http://ec.europa.eu/social/BlobServlet?docId=11366&langId=en> accessed 27 April 2014, p. 41-44. 
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Public Health Care Systems in the EU and the Language of ‘Insurance’ 
Though each Member State has a distinct method of both funding and organizing access to its public 
healthcare system, we can nonetheless observe that generally, Member States have operated public 
healthcare in two distinct styles that have been affected by EU law in different ways.29  First, there 
are Member States who operate systems wherein the population ‘buys’ access to the healthcare 
system through a form of insurance.  The insurance can be publically operated or privately operated, 
under competitive market conditions where different levels of coverage are available from different 
providers.  While choice is available in a system with competing private insurance providers, the 
insurance-based public healthcare model nonetheless presupposes that insurance is mandatory.  
Financially, such a system only works if everyone who uses it buys the insurance, either directly or 
through government credit.  This system is generally known as the ‘social insurance’ model of public 
healthcare financing and operation, and is found (in various forms) in Germany, Austria, France, and 
the Benelux countries, amongst others. 
The European legislation on free movement of economically inactive migrants appears to 
presuppose that national healthcare systems work on an insurance basis.  Until the late 1970s, all six 
original Member States operated insurance-style systems, albeit in different ways.  Most States that 
                                                          
29 For detailed commentary on the structuring and financing of Member State healthcare systems, see, inter 
alia, Adam Oliver and Elias Mossialos, “European Health Systems Reforms: Looking Backward to see Forward?” 
(2005) 30 J.H.P.P.L. 7; Vassilis Hatzopoulos, “Health Law and Policy: The Impact of the EU” in EU Law and the 
Welfare State: in Search of Solidarity (2005); Scott L. Greer, The Politics of European Union Health Policies 
(Maidenhead: Open University Press, 2009); Willy Palm and others, Implications of Recent Jurisprudence on the 
Co-ordination of Health Care Protection Systems (Brussels: Association Internationale de la Mutualite (AIM), 
2000); Wyatt, “Community Competence to Regulate Medical Services” in Social Welfare and EU Law (2005), 
pp. 135-138; Nistor, Public Services and the European Union: Healthcare, Health Insurance and Education 
Services (2011), Chapter 2; Christopher Newdick, “Citizenship, Free Movement and Health Care: Cementing 
Individual Rights by Corroding Social Solidarity” (2006) 43 C.M.L.Rev 1645. 
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have acceded to the EU from the 1970s, however, organise their healthcare systems as ‘national 
health services’.30  While accession of these countries predates the 1990s Residency Directives, it 
postdates the social security coordination regulations that established the terminology still used at 
the EU level to discuss social security benefits: as early as 1958, the Council enacted the predecessor 
of Regulation 883/2004, which ensured that any EU national worker covered by social security 
(including healthcare services) in their home State could use host State social security services when 
working there.31 
Regulation 3/1958 is worded in terms of insurance: for instance, arts. 16 and 17 of the regulation, 
titled “Sickness, Maternity”, describe how “insurance” benefits should be aggregated for a migrant 
worker; and art. 19(4) of the regulation discusses the possibility that a Member State may offer 
more than one “sickness insurance policy”, and makes it clear that migrant EU workers should be 
covered by the policy that nationally would cover those doing manual work in the steel industry.     
Prior to the accession of the UK, Ireland and Denmark, Regulation 3/1958 was repealed by 
Regulation 1408/71,32 coordinating the social security schemes of EU national workers and their 
families when moving within the Community.33  Regulation 1408/71 and its successor, Regulation 
                                                          
30 Italy switched to a national health service in 1978.  One exception is Austria, but it did not accede to the EU 
until 1995; Spain and Greece started operating national health services by the time they acceded.  See Oliver 
and Mossialos, “European Health Systems Reforms: Looking Backward to see Forward?” (2005) 30 J.H.P.P.L. 7, 
14. 
31 Règlement n° 3 concernant la sécurité sociale des travailleurs migrants [1958] OJ L30/561.  
32 Regulation (EEC) No 1408/71 of the Council of 14 June 1971 on the application of social security schemes to 
employed persons and their families moving within the Community  [1971] OJ L149/2. 
33 See also Dragana Damjanovic and Bruno De Witte, “Welfare Integration through EU Law: the Overall Picture 
in the Light of the Lisbon Treaty” in Ulla Neergaard, Ruth Nielsen and Lynn M. Roseberry (eds), Integrating 
Welfare Functions into EU Law: From Rome to Lisbon (Copenhagen: DJØF, 2009), pp. 60-61. 
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883/2004,34 are also drafted with a vocabulary that emphasises social “insurance”; both retain the 
language of Regulation 3/1958 when discussing “Sickness and Maternity” in Title III, Chapter 1.  
Given that all EU Member States first coordinating social security operated a social insurance model 
welfare State, it is plausible that current-day terms used in EU secondary legislation to refer to 
healthcare policy within Member States are rooted in that tradition as well.35 
Under the national health service model, however, citizens are not insured against illness, but rather 
benefit from universal coverage by a State-funded healthcare system.  These types of public 
healthcare systems do not collect individual contributions through employment, as insurance-based 
models do, but rather are funded indirectly through taxation in a variety of ways.  In practical 
operation, many parts of such a national health system are transaction-free.  Whereas in a social 
insurance system, insurance providers and citizens directly communicate about the cost of 
treatment and the general contribution to the health-care system the citizen must make on an 
annual basis, in a national health service system, citizens benefit from treatment that is “free at the 
point of use”, as no payment visibly exchanges hands from the patient to the care provider.36   
As discussed, the precise meaning of healthcare “insurance” has not been addressed by the EU 
legislators or the ECJ, although the Commission issued a reasoned opinion to the UK in April 2012 
that states the following: 
                                                          
34 Regulation (EC) No 883/2004 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on the 
coordination of social security systems [2004] OJ L166/1. 
35 Schoukens and Pieters, “The Rules Within Regulation 883/2004 For Determining the Applicable Legislation” 
(2009) 11 E.J.S.S. 81, p. 104-105, make this point generally regarding the logic underpinning EU social security 
coordination. 
36 Some medical services, such as optometry, dentistry and payments for prescription medication, may require 
a patient contribution; but primary and secondary treatment is normally not charged for.  This differs per 
country; see generally Palm and others, Implications of Recent Jurisprudence on the Co-ordination of Health 
Care Protection Systems (2000). 
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“Under the Free Movement Directive, EU citizens who settle in another EU country but do 
not work there may be required to have sufficient resources and sickness insurance. The 
United Kingdom, however, does not consider entitlement to treatment by the UK public 
healthcare scheme (NHS) as sufficient. This breaches EU law.”37   
The Commission thus appears to view the NHS as a comprehensive sickness insurance provider 
despite the fact that it does not provide insurance.  This classification has significant repercussions in 
light of how entitlement to treatment under the NHS (and other national health services) is normally 
organized.   
NHS Entitlement 
The relevant provisions on entitlement to treatment by the NHS in England are set out in the NHS 
Act 2006 and the NHS (Charging of Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2011.38  Under the NHS Act 2006, 
anyone who is “ordinarily resident” in the UK is entitled to use the NHS for free: section 1(3) states 
that “free” service is obligatory for all those entitled to use it, unless otherwise noted.  An exception 
is contained in section 175, which entitles the UK authorities to introduce additional legislation to 
recover charges from “overseas visitors”. 
                                                          
37 Commission, "Free movement: Commission asks the UK to uphold EU citizens' rights (IP/12/417)". 
38 The National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2011 (SI 2011/1556); equivalent 
legislation exists in Wales (National Health Service (Wales) Act 2006 and National Health Service (Charges to 
Overseas Visitors) Regulations 1989 (SI 1989/306), as amended), Scotland (National Health Service (Scotland) 
Act 1978 and The National Health Service (Charges to Overseas Visitors) (Scotland) Regulations 1989 (SI 
1989/364), as amended) and Northern Ireland (Health and Personal Social Services (Northern Ireland) Order 
1972 (SI 1972/1265), as amended, and Provision of Health Services to Persons not Ordinarily Resident 
Regulations (Northern Ireland) 2005  (SI 2005/551), as amended. 
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The NHS Act 2006 does not define “ordinary residence”, but Department of Health guidance directs 
NHS employees to apply R v Barnet LBC Ex. p Shah39 when deciding if a visitor is to be charged.40  In 
Shah, Lord Scarman ruled that anyone adopting an ‘abode’ voluntarily and for settled purposes “as 
part of the regular order of his life”, regardless of how long, would pass an “ordinary residence” test 
unless said person’s stay in the UK was unlawful.41  This ruling was made in the context of the UK’s 
Education Acts, but—as the Department of Health Guidance states—“is generally recognized to have 
a wider application.”42   
This definition would embrace most, if not all, migrant EU citizens.  It is true that economically 
inactive migrants do not have an unrestricted right to reside in host Member States: as discussed 
above, Art. 7(1) of the Citizens’ Directive requires economically inactive EU citizens to have sufficient 
resources and comprehensive sickness insurance before they have a right to reside for longer than 3 
months.43  However, the NHS Act 2006 and the definition given to the term “ordinary residence” 
produce a sequencing issue.  When a self-sufficient EU citizen arrives with sufficient resources in the 
UK, as well as an intention to stay in the UK for “settled purposes”, the NHS Act 2006 entitles him or 
                                                          
39 R v Barnet LBC, ex p Shah [1983] 2 AC 309, [1983] 2 WLR 16 
40Department of Health, “Guidance on Implementing the Overseas Visitors Hospital Charging Regulations” 
(October 2013) http://www.dh.gov.uk/publications [Accessed April 9, 2014], para. 3.4. 
41 Shah [1983] 2 AC 309, p. 343. 
42 Department of Health, “Guidance on Implementing the Overseas Visitors Hospital Charging Regulations”, 
para. 3.4. 
43 See Anthony Valcke, “Five Years of the Citizens' Directive in the UK: Part 2” (2011) 25 J.I.A.N.L. 331, 
considering this issue from the perspective of UK non-compliance with Directive 2004/38/EC. 
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her to NHS treatment free of charge.  The requirement for “comprehensive sickness insurance” 
would thus appear automatically satisfied for nearly all EU migrants intending to live in the UK.44   
Coverage for “Overseas Visitors” 
The NHS access rights conundrum is exacerbated by the UK rules which permit recovery of NHS 
healthcare costs, which are laid down in the NHS (Charging of Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2011.  
While there is an argument to be made that economically inactive EU citizens should not be able to 
pass an “ordinary residence” test unless they are not reliant on the NHS (and thus not burdening UK 
public funds), domestic regulation makes free healthcare explicitly available for “exempt” overseas 
visitors in nearly all situations that would cover economically inactive EU migration. 
First of all, the NHS (Charging of Overseas Visitors) Regulations 2011 exempt all students registered 
on a substantially State-funded degree course lasting for more than 6 months from NHS charges.45  
This is reinforced by the Department of Health’s guidance on this point, which stresses that if a 
student presents an European Health Insurance Card (EHIC), granted by their home Member State 
under Regulation 883/2004, the NHS can reclaim treatment costs from their home State competent 
institution—but that “a student does not have to have an EHIC to prove entitlement under the 
student exemption.”46  Additional exemptions exist for all residents who have lawfully resided in the 
UK for longer than twelve months,47 and finally, all direct family members (ie, spouses, children) of 
other ‘exempt visitors’ are also entitled to free NHS care.48   
                                                          
44 See Department of Health, “Guidance on Implementing the Overseas Visitors Hospital Charging 
Regulations”, paras 3.5-3.13, which stresses that there is no minimum residency period to become ‘ordinarily 
resident’. 
45 2011 Regulations, reg 8(2)(d). 
46 Department of Health, “Guidance on Implementing the Overseas Visitors Hospital Charging Regulations”, 
para. 3.41. 
47 2011 Regulations, reg 7(1). 
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In conclusion, under domestic UK law on health-care access, all economically inactive EU citizens are 
entitled to free NHS treatment after having resided in the UK for twelve months.  In the case of 
students enrolled in a degree that lasts longer than 6 months, the entitlement begins on the day 
they arrive to study. 
 
UK Implementation and Application of EU Law 
UK Interpretations of Directive 2004/38 and Comprehensive Sickness Insurance 
To compensate for the very generous “free NHS health care for residents” legislation in force in the 
UK, the UK authority charged with supplying EU residency documentation (UK Visas and Immigration 
(UKVI)) holds that entitlement to the NHS does not equate to having “comprehensive sickness 
insurance”. 
The UK has implemented the Citizens’ Directive through the Immigration (European Economic Area) 
Regulations 2006.49  The 2006 Regulations retain the Directive’s references to “comprehensive 
sickness insurance” without any amendments.50  It bears emphasising here that national authorities 
like the UKVI do not actually have the power to grant EU nationals free movement rights, as these 
are guaranteed by EU law in art. 21 TFEU and the Citizens’ Directive; 51 instead, the UK authorities 
have an obligation to recognise those rights by issuing status confirmation documents.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
48 2011 Regulations, reg 24(3). 
49 The Immigration (European Economic Area) Regulations 2006 (SI 2006/1003) 
50 Valcke, “Five Years of the Citizens' Directive in the UK: Part 2” (2011) 25 J.I.A.N.L. 331. 
51 Citizens’ Directive, arts. 4 and 5 provide rights to exit and entry, and arts. 6, 7, and 16 provide the rights to 
reside for up to three months, between three months and five years, and permanently.  
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UKVI has made available its working definition of “comprehensive sickness insurance” in Modernised 
Guidance on “how it considers the free movement rights” of EU citizens,52 as well as in instructions 
to UKVI “caseworkers” processing EU applications.53  The Casework Instructions indicate that three 
possible documents can be included as proof of sickness insurance: first, home State coverage—as 
evidenced by the EHIC or Forms S1, S2 or S3—will suffice as proof of comprehensive sickness 
insurance for those in the UK on a temporary basis.  In addition, the UKBA will consider a private 
health insurance policy document as proof of comprehensive sickness insurance if it will cover the 
EU citizen for “medical treatment in the majority of circumstances” during their stay in the UK.54 
The Modernised Guidance states the following with regards to “comprehensive sickness 
insurance”: 
“EEA nationals who must have medical insurance cannot rely on the NHS as 
providing medical insurance. Medical insurance must cover an existing medical 
conditions and any treatment that can be required for serious or long term medical 
conditions. EEA nationals and their family members must show that they will not be 
a burden on the public finances of the UK.”55  
 
                                                          
52 UK Visas and Immigration, "Casework Instructions: Chapter 4 - Registration Certificate Applications" (2014)  
http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/european-casework-instructions  [Accessed April 9, 2014]. 
53 UK Visas and Immigration, "European Economic Area (EEA) and Swiss nationals: free movement rights" 
(2014)  http://www.gov.uk/government/publications/eea-and-swiss-nationals-free-movement-rights  
[Accessed April 9, 2014]. 
54 UK Visas and Immigration, "Casework Instructions: Chapter 4 - Registration Certificate Applications", p. 13. 
55 UK Visas and Immigration, "European Economic Area (EEA) and Swiss nationals: free movement rights", p. 
35. 
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Parts of this are non-controversial.  Where temporary EU migrants are covered by social security 
institutions in their home States under Regulation 883/2004, the EHIC (and the related S forms for 
pensioners) allows European migrants to travel with and rely on their home State “comprehensive 
sickness insurance” cover. 56 
It is when economically inactive EU migrants do not retain social security cover in their home States 
that the UKBA’s definition of “comprehensive sickness insurance” is problematic—and, as discussed, 
under the  current EU regime for coordinating social security, not all EU migrants will retain their 
home State cover.57  Economically inactive migrants—regardless of if they are students, pensioners, 
or self-sufficient—are not per se habitually resident in their home Member States, as has been 
stressed recently in Commission guidance on how to apply the “habitual residence” test.58  Current 
UK policy does not recognise this.  As an example, UKVI and the Department of Health in the UK 
both assume that all migrant students are only studying in the UK on a temporary basis and remain 
habitually resident in their home State.59  The Commission’s guidance, however, makes clear that a 
student enrolled in a degree programme in the UK may habitually reside there, such as when the 
student’s studies are funded by a UK body and the student has no demonstrable intention to leave 
                                                          
56 On the European coordination of patient mobility, see generally Willy Palm and Irene A. Glinos, “Enabling 
Patient Mobility in the EU: Between Free Movement and Coordination” in Mossialos and others (eds), Health 
Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law and Policy (2010). 
57 See generally Schoukens and Pieters, “The Rules Within Regulation 883/2004 For Determining the Applicable 
Legislation” (2009) 11 E.J.S.S. 81. 
58 Commission, ‘Practical Guide’, p. 41-49. 
59 UK Visas and Immigration, "Casework Instructions: Chapter 4 - Registration Certificate Applications", p. 13; 
see also Department of Health, "Guidance on Implementing the Overseas Visitors Hospital Charging 
Regulations" (October 2013).  http://www.dh.gov.uk/publications  [Accessed April 9, 2014], para. 7.18. 
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the UK.60 The application of Regulation 883/2004 for the latter student results in coverage by UK 
social security; this student will thus not have a home State EHIC to present in the UK. 
UKVI envisages that not all EU migrants will have an EHIC, but rather than instructing EU migrants 
“resident” in the UK under Regulation 883/2004 to submit evidence of NHS entitlement, it indicates 
that private health insurance may also suffice as evidence of “comprehensive sickness insurance”.  
The Modernised Guidance and the Caseworker Instructions also describe a different level of 
coverage as required: where the Modernised Guidance requires coverage of pre-existing and chronic 
conditions, the Casework Instructions require cover in the “majority of circumstances”.  The 
Modernised Guidance’s requirement is perhaps more on point.  It is difficult to perceive of private 
insurance that does not cover pre-existing conditions as being “comprehensive”, since a pre-existing 
condition is much more likely to “burden” the host State healthcare system.  However, the Casework 
Instructions appear to be taking a realistic view of what EU migrants can provide in terms of private 
cover; private health insurance obtained in the UK is highly unlikely to provide the same level of 
coverage that the NHS does. 61 
Some private cover, in other words, is treated as preferable to none; indeed, most important here is 
that both the Casework Instructions and the Modernised Guidance stress that entitlement to the 
NHS will not be considered as proof of having met the requirements set out by the Citizens’ 
Directive.  The Modernised Guidance justifies this position by reference to the Court of Appeal 
judgment in W (China) and X (China) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department.62   
                                                          
60 Commission, para. 4.6-4.7. 
61 This has been found to be the case in the EU generally; see Thomson and Mossialos, “Private Health 
Insurance and the Internal Market” in Health Systems Governance in Europe: The Role of European Union Law 
and Policy (2010), p. 460. 
62 W (China), X (China) v The Secretary of State for the Home Department [2006] EWCA Civ 1494; [2007] 1 WLR 
1514 
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This case concerned the application of the ECJ’s Chen63 principle to two Chinese parents with a baby 
with Irish nationality.  The parents were illegally in the UK at the time the case was decided, but 
were attempting to apply for EU residency rights as carers for their child (an Irish national) under 
Directive 90/364.  The Court of Appeal agreed with the approach taken by the Immigration Appeal 
Tribunal, which interpreted Chen as meaning that the third country national (TCN) parent would 
need to meet the same requirements as an economically inactive EU migrant would, by being able to 
demonstrate self-sufficiency and the presence of sickness insurance. 
W and X argued that W met the requirement for health insurance because his employment was 
subject to social security contributions; in other words, he was “paying for” NHS treatment much as 
any other employed UK resident does.64 
Buxton LJ rejected this argument on two fronts.  Firstly, he observed that, “in the case of the United 
Kingdom the requirement of sickness insurance was otiose, or automatically fulfilled, because health 
care was in any event available free of charge under the National Health Service.”65  He dismissed 
this reasoning, however, stating that it “overlooks the fundamental reason for the insurance 
requirement that was identified as the basis of the scheme of the Directive in Chen: to prevent the 
                                                          
63 Kunqian Catherine Zhu and Man Lavette Chen v Secretary of State for the Home Department (C-200/02) 
[2004] E.C.R. I-09925, para. 47. 
64 W and X [2006] EWCA Civ 1494, para. 9. 
65 W and X [2006] EWCA Civ 1494, para. 10; on this, see also Filip van Overmeiren, Eberhard Eichenhofer and 
Herwig Verschueren, “Social Security Coverage of Non-Active Persons Moving to Another Member State” in 
Elspeth Guild, Cristina Gortázar Rotaeche and Dora Kostakopoulou (eds), The Reconceptualization of European 
Union Citizenship (Leiden: Brill Nijhof, 2014), pp. 253-254, noting that a lack of clarity on the relationship 
between the Citizens’ Directive and Regulation 883/2004 results in economically inactive migrants having 
automatic entitlement to “sickness insurance” in the host State once they are factually resident there. 
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presence of the EU citizen placing a burden on the host State. Use of free State medical services 
exactly creates such a burden.”66  
Buxton LJ followed this up with a second argument as to why NHS entitlement does not equate to 
“sickness insurance”: 
 
“It is also because of the nature of the NHS that the social security payments 
currently being made by W do not count as “insurance” for these purposes. The 
NHS scheme is not financed solely out of the social security scheme, but is largely 
tax-financed. Contribution to the social security fund cannot therefore serve as any 
sort of proxy for insurance designed to remove from the taxpayer the burden of 
providing health care.”67 
In short, Buxton LJ did not dispute that the NHS is a health care provider, but stressed that it was not 
a health care insurer.  The nature of its funding and its regulation of access means that reliance on 
the NHS runs anathema to the Directive’s purpose in requiring comprehensive sickness insurance in 
the first place: to prevent the UK finances from being ‘unreasonably burdened’ by economically 
inactive EU citizens.  Consequently, he ruled that W and X had not satisfied the “sickness insurance” 
requirement, and thus did not have a right to reside in the UK on the basis of EU law.   
Buxton LJ’s position has been reiterated in subsequent UK court judgments.  Sullivan LJ in FK (Kenya) 
v Secretary of State for the Home Department found that:  
                                                          
66 W and X [2006] EWCA Civ 1494, para. 10. 
67 W and X [2006] EWCA Civ 1494, para. 11. 
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“A person who has to rely on the United Kingdom's National Health Service is no 
more self-sufficient than a person whose resources are inadequate so that he may 
become a burden on the United Kingdom's social assistance system.”68 
Most recently, the Court of Appeal confirmed this interpretation of the Citizenship Directive’s 
requirements in Ahmad v Secretary of State for the Home Department.69  Strikingly, Arden LJ here 
accepted the following submission from counsel for the Secretary of State:   
“Article 4 of Regulation 883/2004 provides that EU citizens "shall enjoy the 
same benefits and be subject to the same obligations under the legislation of 
any Member State as the nationals thereof". Under the UK's domestic social 
security legislation EU citizens who are entitled to free NHS treatment are 
provided with exactly the same access to care, and standard of care, as British 
nationals. So EU nationals from other Member States are not discriminated 
against under that Regulation. Article 4 of the Regulation has no bearing on the 
correct application of the residence requirements in the Directive.”70 (emphasis 
added) 
In the view of the Court of Appeal, then, as economically inactive EU migrants are permitted to use 
the NHS treatment they are entitled to, the UK has satisfied its obligations under Regulation 
883/2004.  However, such entitlement cannot be used to satisfy the requirements of the 
Citizenship’s Directive.  What this means in practice is that economically inactive EU migrants are 
permitted to use the NHS, but where they want confirmation of their EU residency rights or wish to 
apply for permanent residency in the UK, they must be able to demonstrate that they were not 
                                                          
68 FK ( Kenya) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2010] EWCA Civ 1302, para. 15. 
69 Ahmad v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2014] EWCA Civ 988 
70 Ahmad [2014] EWCA Civ 988, para. 39. 
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actually ever reliant on the NHS.  Such an interpretation makes it challenging to describe 
“entitlement to the NHS” for these migrants as an EU-coordinated benefit. 
Alternative UK Interpretations of Comprehensive Sickness Insurance 
A first sign of disagreement with Buxton LJ’s interpretation is found within the W and X case itself, 
where Buxton LJ’s purposive interpretation seems to ignore the actual wording of the Directive.  
Sedley LJ, despite ultimately agreeing with Buxton LJ, made the following observation: 
“I would enter a caveat as to whether the Directive, when it speaks of [sickness 
insurance] is necessarily speaking of private health insurance.  … Nothing would 
have been easier, in the Directive and in the [Immigration] Rules, than to include 
the word “private” if that alone was what was meant – especially since, so far as I 
know, private insurance rarely if ever covers all risks, such as the risk of requiring 
long-term medical care.”71 
Several subsequent UK judgments have explicitly72 or implicitly73 agreed with Sedley LJ’s 
observation.  In the reasoned opinion it has sent to the UK, the Commission appears to follow this 
position as well.74  The emphasis on entitlement in its opinion suggests that it finds that if 
economically inactive EU migrants are permitted to access the NHS under domestic law, such 
permission equates to having “comprehensive sickness insurance” cover in the UK. 
Whereas UKVI and Buxton LJ focus on the Directive’s requirement of insurance so as to preclude an 
unreasonable public burden from being created on the UK, the Commission appears to have 
commenced infringement proceedings on the basis that the requirement for “comprehensive 
                                                          
71 W and X [2006] EWCA Civ 1494, para. 26. 
72 AS v HM Revenue and Customs (CB) [2013] NICom 15, para. 128(xii). 
73 Secretary of State for Work and Pensions v SW [2011] UKUT 508 (AAC), para. 20. 
74 Commission, "Free movement: Commission asks the UK to uphold EU citizens' rights (IP/12/417)". 
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sickness insurance” is simply a requirement for healthcare coverage and consequently, entitlement 
to the NHS fully satisfies the requirement. 
It is not clear how the UK government is contesting the Commission’s views.  The Financial Times has 
reported that the Home Office disagrees with the Commission’s perspective on the UK position, and 
will argue that “the NHS cannot be seen as an insurance policy to anyone in the EU and that the 
controls are essential to ensuring economically inactive EU citizens do not place an undue burden on 
the State.”75  This follows from what UKVI guidance and Buxton LJ also have alluded to: the Citizens’ 
Directive’s teleological aim of avoiding unreasonably burdening public finances of the Member 
States when extending residency rights to economically inactive EU citizens should guide any 
interpretation of what the Directive requires.  As the purpose of requiring migrants to have 
“comprehensive sickness insurance” is to avoid a burden on the host State’s public finances, NHS 
entitlement cannot satisfy this requirement, as it creates a burden.   However, the UK approach 
raises a crucial question about the Citizens’ Directive’s wording: when does a burden become 
unreasonable? 
 
Possibilities for Excluding Economically Inactive EU Citizens from the NHS 
Denying the Right to Reside: ‘Unreasonable Burden’ 
The UK is not the only country that is struggling with EU migrant access to a national health system 
in the post-citizenship EU; for instance, Valcke observes similar problems in Spain and France.76  The 
                                                          
75 Barker, "Britain falls foul of Brussels over immigration". 
76 Anthony Valcke, 'Five Years of the Citizens' Directive in the UK: Part 2' (2011) 25 J.I.A.N.L 331, p. 342. See 
also Greer, The Politics of European Union Health Policies (2009), pp. 97, 145; Simone Sandier, Valérie Paris and 
Dominique Polton, Health Care Systems in Transition: France (Geneva: WHO, 2004); Isabelle Durand-Zaleski, 
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costs of providing healthcare to all economically inactive residents of a Member State are potentially 
significant; the UK Department of Health’s estimates make it clear that potentially, there are several 
hundreds of thousands of EEA migrants who—unless covered by social security in their home 
State—are not contributing to the NHS, but entitled to use it for free all the same.77  
The ECJ’s case law has historically respected that free movement has significant consequences for 
the financing of public services in the Member States, and that these consequences are potentially 
particularly severe for Member States that grant access to social benefits on the basis of residence.  
The EU’s social security coordination regulations reflect these concerns; Regulation 883/2004’s 
provisions on sickness and healthcare benefits require that where a pensioner collects a pension in 
one Member State and resides in another Member State, it is the State where the pensioner was 
economically active that will bear the cost of the healthcare provided in the State of residence.78  In 
Rundgren, the ECJ discusses the operation of these coordination rules and notes that they exist to 
prevent “penalising” Member States that grant social security benefits on the basis of residence.79  
However, the Regulation manages to effectively coordinate responsibility for extending healthcare 
benefits for pensioners largely because pensioners were workers at one time, and consequently 
have paid contributions to at least one social security system.  What of the economically inactive, 
who are either too young to have contributed—as will be true for many students—or, for any other 
reason, have simply not been covered by home State social security?   
                                                                                                                                                                                    
"The French Health Care System" (2008). 
http://www.commonwealthfund.org/usr_doc/France_Country_Profile_2008.pdf  [Accessed April 9, 2014]. 
77 Department of Health, "2012 Review of overseas visitors charging policy (Summary Document)" (April 2012).  
http://www.gov.uk/dh  [Accessed April 9, 2014]. 
78 Regulation 883/2004, art. 24(2)(b). 
79 Sulo Rundgren (C-389/99) [2001] E.C.R. I-03731, para. 45. 
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For such migrants, it is exclusively host State domestic law that determines if they are entitled to 
access public healthcare systems.  In the case of a health care system that operates on a social 
insurance basis, the EU migrant will be able to buy participation in the system on equivalent grounds 
to all national residents as well as all economically active EU migrant residents.80  In a health care 
system that operates on a residency basis alone, however, there is no option for “buying” access.  
National law such as that of the UK simply grants access.  In recognition of this, the Citizenship 
Directive permits Member States to declare economically inactive EU migrants to be an 
“unreasonable burden” if they rely on the benefits to which they are legally entitled to an 
“unreasonable” extent.  Being declared such a burden would then deprive them of a right to reside 
in the host State.81  Additionally, the Citizenship Directive excludes certain types of benefits from its 
equal treatment principle, largely because they would pose an ‘unreasonable burden’; an example 
that has been subject to much case law is study financing, which does not have to be extended to 
migrant EU students until they have obtained permanent residence, per art. 24(2) of the Directive.82 
                                                          
80 See, for instance, on access to the Dutch healthcare system, Rosenau and Lako, “An Experiment with 
Regulated Competition and Individual Mandates for Universal Health Care: The New Dutch Health Insurance 
System” (2008) 33 J.H.P.P.L. 1031. 
81 It has been argued that the concept of a “burden” does not strictly apply to the sickness insurance 
requirement on a reading of art. 7 of the Directive; see van Overmeiren, Eichenhofer and Verschueren, “Social 
Security Coverage of Non-Active Persons Moving to Another Member State” in The Reconceptualization of 
European Union Citizenship (2014), p. 254.  It is submitted here that the ECJ’s generally purposive/contextual 
approach to statutory interpretation is likely to result in a less literal interpretation of art. 7. 
82 See The Queen, on the application of Dany Bidar v London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for 
Education and Skills (C-209/03) [2005] E.C.R. I-02119; Jacqueline Förster v Hoofddirectie van de Informatie 
Beheer Groep (C-158/07) [2008] E.C.R. I-08507. 
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Unfortunately, what constitutes an “unreasonable” burden has been very differently interpreted in 
different Member States.83  The Citizens’ Directive itself does not provide a definition; it merely 
suggests in its preamble that Member States, in determining if a migrant EU citizen presents such a 
burden, must “examine whether it is a case of temporary difficulties and take into account the 
duration of residence, the personal circumstances and the amount of aid granted .”84 The ECJ’s brief 
comments in Grzelczyk, concerning a student’s ability to request a social security benefit in his host 
State, confirm that these were the relevant factors for the referring court to consider in determining 
if Mr. Grzelczyk was an unreasonable burden on Belgium.85  Similarly, in Bidar and Förster, the ECJ 
considered the extent of duration of students applying for study financing in determining if the 
burden they presented was ‘unreasonable’.86  Additionally, as Baumbast demonstrates, the ECJ has 
required that any restriction on access to benefits of an EU migrant must be proportionate in light of 
the extent of burden that the individual migrant poses.87  Baumbast and Grzelczyk thus suggest that 
the current blanket rule applied by the UKVI, which simply states that entitlement to the NHS is in no 
circumstances evidence of “comprehensive sickness insurance”, is likely disproportionate. 
                                                          
83 See generally, Paul Minderhoud, “Directive 2004/38 and access to social assistance benefits” (2011) 18 
J.S.S.L. 153; Sergio Carrera and Anais Faure Atger, “Implementation of Directive 2004/38 in the context of EU 
Enlargement: A proliferation of different forms of citizenship?” (CEPS Special Report, April 2009). 
http://www.ceps.eu [Accessed April 9, 2014]. 
84 Citizens' Directive, recital 16. 
85 See paras. 44-45 in Rudy Grzelczyk v Centre public d'aide sociale d'Ottignies-Louvain-la-Neuve (C-184/99) 
[2001] E.C.R. I-06193; see also Anastasia Iliopoulou and Helen Toner, “Case Note: Grzelczyk” (2002) 39 
C.M.L.Rev 609, p. 611. 
86 Bidar [2005] E.C.R. I-02119, para. 59-62; Förster [2008] E.C.R. I-08507, para. 50-55. 
87 Baumbast [2002] E.C.R. I-07091, paras. 90-93. See additionally Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-06193; Chen [2004] 
E.C.R. I-09925, paras. 27-33, and for commentary, Michael Dougan and Eleanor Spaventa, “Educating Rudy and 
the Non-English Patient: A Double Bill on Residency Rights under Article 18 EC” (2003) 28 E.L.Rev 697. 
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In picking apart the Citizens’ Directive’s description of what constitutes an unreasonable burden, 
however, the problem that the UK is faced with becomes apparent.  For one, entitlement to the NHS 
does not equate to reliance on the NHS.  NHS entitlement is not akin to the collection of other types 
of benefit, where a cash transfer of public finance to the benefit claimant means that a monetary 
‘burden’ exists immediately;88 instead, entitlement to the NHS is principally cost-free unless an 
economically inactive EU migrant actually presents with healthcare needs.  It will be very difficult for 
the UK government to demonstrate that an economically inactive EU migrant who has never used 
NHS services when applying for confirmation of permanent residency was nonetheless an 
“unreasonable burden” on UK public finances.89   
More worryingly, applying a proportionality assessment to any reliance on the NHS will require UK 
authorities to evaluate not only, as per Grzelczyk, how integrated into the UK a claimant is but also 
how much of a drain they have been on public finances.  Compliance with the Directive’s proposed 
evaluation of the extent of ‘burden’ that is posed by an EU migrant is thus likely to require every 
applicant for EU residency documentation to print off an itemized, dated bill of their healthcare 
costs, so that UKVI can make a proportionate determination of the ‘reasonableness’ of their burden 
on public finances.  National measures short of such an individual assessment would not satisfy the 
EU’s proportionality test.  The UK courts appear to recognize this: in Ahmad, Arden LJ distinguished 
Baumbast by noting that “Mr Baumbast did not make any calls on the National Health Service 
                                                          
88 As was the case in Grzelczyk [2001] E.C.R. I-06193. 
89 In Ahmad [2014] EWCA Civ 988, para 51, counsel for the Secretary of State argued that it is proportionate to 
require economically inactive migrants to hold sickness insurance, as otherwise “the host [would be] at risk of 
having to assume the consequences of the absence of insurance.”  Arden LJ accepted this reasoning, but in the 
view of the author, there is no reason to assume on the basis of the ECJ’s existing case law that it would agree. 
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whereas Mrs Ahmad has had two children since she arrived in the UK”, and consequently their 
individual factual circumstances were incomparable.90 
How much reliance on publicly-funded social security by economically inactive EU migrants is 
‘unreasonable’ has not been clarified by the ECJ.  Academic commentary has been sceptical: 
Hailbronner has argued that it is inconceivable that any one claimant of social security can actually 
affect public finances to an extent where they, individually, are an unreasonable burden.91  Other 
commentators seem to generally agree that the ECJ’s methodology for determining when a burden 
is unreasonable has meant that very few individual economically inactive EU migrants will qualify for 
this status.92  Unless they do, however, Member States have no option but to consider their benefit 
applications on their merits: the Citizens’ Directive stresses expulsion can never be the automatic 
consequence of applying for benefits, which suggests that relying on entitlement to the NHS cannot 
result in a revocation of residency rights.93 
The current UKVI approach of treating entitlement to NHS treatment as never being evidence of 
“comprehensive sickness insurance” thus seems untenable.  Neither EU law nor guidance suggests 
that NHS entitlement somehow is not a form of comprehensive sickness insurance.  Additionally, 
while the ECJ does not appear unsympathetic to the UK’s concerns regarding economically inactive 
migrants relying on the NHS, its case law also strongly suggests that UKVI’s current policy is 
disproportionate.  In Baumbast the Court could have declared that any reliance on the NHS by 
economically inactive EU migrants would be an unreasonable burden, but it focused instead on the 
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Baumbast family’s specific circumstances.  While some migrants may thus be an unreasonable 
burden, any such determination made by the UK must be supported by an individualised 
assessment. 
This does not resolve the UK’s conundrum.  Administratively, the prospect of needing to consider 
how entitlement to and/or reliance on the NHS affects each individual EU migrant’s ability to claim a 
right to reside would drastically increase the cost of processing EU residency documentation – and, 
as O’Leary has argued, would at best create a different type of burden on UK public finances.94   
An alternative solution to the problem outlined above would be to change domestic access 
entitlements to the NHS so that economically inactive EU migrants no longer can rely on the NHS.  
However, this is likely to lead to other difficulties, as EU law indirectly but significantly impacts how 
access to the NHS can be regulated. 
Restricting Entitlement to the NHS: Equal Treatment and ‘Real Links’   
If the UK wishes to restrict the NHS care entitlement of economically inactive EU migrants, it must 
find means of doing so that do not violate EU law.  This is made difficult by the art. 18 TFEU 
prohibition of discrimination on the grounds of nationality, given particular context for EU citizens by 
the equal treatment right articulated in art. 24 of the Citizens’ Directive.95  Art. 18 TFEU forbids 
discrimination on the grounds of nationality (de jure or de facto) insofar as an area of domestic law is 
within the EU Treaties’ material scope, albeit with several exceptions found in secondary legislation:  
as noted, student maintenance grants are potentially excluded by art. 24(2) of the Citizens’ Directive, 
as is “social assistance” within the first three months of residing in a host State.  
                                                          
94 O'Leary, “Developing an Ever Closer Union Between the Peoples of Europe?”, p. 14. 
95 See also art. 4 of Regulation 883/2004, which requires equal treatment between EU migrants and nationals 
of the competent State.  
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In considering the possibility of restricting NHS access, in determining if art. 24(2) of the Citizens’ 
Directive means that entitlement to the NHS can be restricted for the first three months of EU 
citizens’ residence in the UK, it is necessary to consider what the Citizens’ Directive means by “social 
assistance”. 
In Brey,96 the ECJ has for the first time considered “social assistance” in the context of the Citizens’ 
Directive, and defined it as:    
“all assistance introduced by the public authorities… that can be claimed by an individual 
who does not have resources sufficient to meet his own basic needs and the needs of his 
family and who, by reason of that fact, may become a burden on the public finances of the 
host Member State during his period of residence...”97   
In the ECJ’s view, “social assistance” in art. 24 therefore refers to publicly funded assistance that 
migrants become dependent upon because they lack sufficient resources.  NHS access, however, is 
not a resource-dependent or means-tested benefit; it cannot be “paid for” even by those who do 
have sufficient resources to not burden the public finances of the UK.  Under the Brey definition, 
access to the NHS is not a form of “social assistance”.98 
If NHS entitlement is not deemed to be “social assistance”, withdrawing access rights for 
economically inactive EU migrants is impermissible under EU law, both in the first three months of 
residence and in the subsequent years.  Art. 24(1) of the Citizens’ Directive and Article 4 of 
Regulation 883/2004 both require equal treatment with host State nationals in comparable 
                                                          
96 Pensionsversicherungsanstalt v Peter Brey (Case C-140/12 ) September 13, 2013. 
97 Brey (Case C-140/12), para. 61. 
98 This argument has been made by Valcke, “Five Years of the Citizens' Directive in the UK: Part 2” (2011) 25 
J.I.A.N.L. 331, in light of the ECJ’s interpretation of “social assistance” in Council Directive 2003/86/EC of 22 
September 2003 on the right to family reunification [2003] OJ L251/12, in Rhimou Chakroun v Minister van 
Buitenlandse Zaken (C-578/08) [2010] E.C.R. I-01839. 
33 
 
positions. Thus, if every economically inactive UK national has a right to use the NHS on account of 
residing in the UK, every economically inactive EU national resident in the UK would similarly be 
entitled; any alternative would be discriminatory on the grounds of nationality.99 
The ECJ has, however, recognised that granting access to publicly funded social security to all 
economically inactive EU migrants may make domestic social security systems unsustainable.  It has 
therefore held that it is permissible for Member States to restrict access to benefits only to those 
migrants who can demonstrate a “real link” or a “genuine link” to the host State.100  The concept of a 
“real link” was introduced in D’Hoop, and has since been applied by the ECJ in cases where Member 
States wish to justify restrictions on social security benefits.  In doing so, the ECJ has held that “the 
proof required to demonstrate the genuine link must not be too exclusive in nature or unduly favour 
one element which is not necessarily representative of the real and effective degree of connection 
between the claimant and the Member State...”101 Additionally, in Commission v Austria, the ECJ 
stressed that “the genuine link required … need not be fixed in a uniform matter for all benefits, but 
should be established according to the constitutive elements of the benefit in question.”102  How 
would such a “real link” look with regards to NHS access as the benefit in question? 
The first difficulty of a “real link” test is that it, too, requires a proportionate examination of the 
circumstances of any particular applicant.  The ECJ’s suggested approaches to such an examination 
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are occasionally generous; for instance, in Commission v Austria, the ECJ held that evidence that a 
student is actually studying in Austria would be an appropriate indicator of a “real link” between a 
student and the host State.103  Assessment in relation to unemployment benefits has followed a 
similar logic: having sought work in the host State for some time suffices in demonstrating a 
“genuine link” between a jobseeker and the host State.104 
This reasoning cannot be extended to benefits applied for by the generally economically inactive; it 
is difficult to imagine what, beyond residence, could demonstrate a “link” between an economically 
self-sufficient EU migrant and the host State.  The ECJ has in principle permitted residency to be used 
as a measure of a connection to the host State, but has not established clear threshold durations in 
its case law: what it would deem to be an appropriate amount of “residence” to demonstrate a “real 
link” to the UK for the purposes of relying on NHS entitlement is at best guesswork. 
Different assessments of “residence” have very different implications for the host State.  For 
instance, it has been argued that as “habitual residence” under Regulation 883/2004 acts as a 
sufficient connection to the host State to make it competent for social security, what Regulation 
883/2004 is measuring in examining habitual residence is analogous to a “real link”.  Such a “link” is 
not dependent on the duration of residence; it can, depending on the migrant’s circumstances, be 
instantaneous once the migrant starts living in the host State.105  
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Conversely, the ECJ’s guidance to national authorities suggests that a “reasonable period” of 
residence may demonstrate a “real link”.106  However, Stewart makes it clear that requiring a 
“reasonable period” of residence would nonetheless violate the proportionality principle, as it 
excludes all other possible means by which a claimant could demonstrate a connection to the host 
State.107  The difficulties inherent to a “real link” investigation are thus are similar to those produced 
by the “unreasonable burden” test outlined above: proving that there is no genuine link would 
require the UK, at significant cost, to consider all possible relevant indicators of connectedness in an 
economically inactive EU migrant’s life. 
There are additional problems with only entitling economically active EU migrants with “real links” 
to NHS access, and these stem from the fact that a non-discriminatory version of such a test will 
negatively affect migrant UK nationals. Much like potential EU citizen migrants, UK nationals who 
have lived abroad may struggle to demonstrate the existence of such a link without resorting to their 
nationality as supporting evidence; but doing so would be precluded by art. 18 TFEU. 108  Recent 
Department of Health109 and Home Office110 consultations on amending the NHS access rules—
where “ordinary residence” is perceived as too easily met by non-EEA migrants, in light of growing 
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funding pressures for the NHS—suggest that the political will to exclude migrant UK nationals from 
NHS access is absent; the proposals under consultation would actually extend coverage for UK 
nationals residing abroad.  The “real link” test thus offers no better solutions to the UK than the 
“unreasonable burden” test does: economically inactive EU migrants cannot generally be denied 
entitlement to NHS treatment without this resulting in violations of EU law. 
National Health Services and EU Law: Compatible? 
The cost of economically inactive EU migrants relying on public health services is unlikely to affect 
social insurance-style health care systems to the same extent.  In insurance-based systems there is 
general scope for ensuring that migrants pay into the system, regardless of whether or not they are 
economically active, as the systems are organised in such a way that all residents pay insurance 
premiums to support their healthcare.  There is far less scope for mitigating migrant health costs 
under the operating principles of a national health service.111   
Nothing in law stops the UK from requiring financial input from all economically inactive NHS 
users;112 the Irish public health service, for instance, applies a nominal charge to hospital stays for all 
Irish residents.113  However, taking such a step would fundamentally change the NHS from a 
universal, ‘free at the point of use’ service to a system with significant insurance-style traits.  Every 
economically inactive UK resident, regardless of nationality, would have to pay a fixed fee so as to 
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not unduly burden UK public finances; and granting free treatment only to returning, retired UK 
expatriates would not be possible under such a system, as they would find themselves in an identical 
position to newly-resident economically inactive EU migrants.114   
Additionally, there are substantial practical difficulties in introducing such changes to the NHS.  
Given that to date there have never been charges for most NHS care services, setting the level of an 
appropriate payment would not be straight-forward; this is confirmed by the Department of Health’s 
2013 consultation on charging for TCN migrant healthcare, which alludes to undescribed “other 
factors” to consider when setting the level of such a migrant charge.115  The ECJ is unlikely to be 
sympathetic to any difficulties involved in introducing a fee payment for NHS access rights, however.  
In Watts, the UK was simply told that being an EU Member State “inevitably” resulted in some 
changes needing to be made to the operation of its social services.116 
Even in an area of welfare regulation where the EU has no competence to act, there thus seems to 
be a significant pull from the internal market towards further convergence of approach.  Moreover, 
such a converged approach is far more likely to have the traits of the market-oriented purchased 
health care systems than the traits of the more socially-oriented national health services, as the EU’s 
decades-old law on both freedom of movement of persons and social security only truly 
accommodates the social insurance setup.  
 
Conclusion 
                                                          
114 See Davies, “'Any Place I Hang My Hat?' or: Residence is the New Nationality” (2005) 11 E.L.J. 43. 
115 Department of Health, "Sustaining services, ensuring fairness: A consultation on migrant access and their 
financial contribution to NHS provision in England", p. 19.  See also Davies, “The Community's Internal Market-
Based Competence to Regulate Healthcare: Scope, Strategies and Consequences” (2007) 14 M.J. 215, pp. 232-
234. 
116 Watts [2006] E.C.R. I-04325, para. 121. 
38 
 
Member States retain the competence to organize their national healthcare systems as they see fit, 
but this may be little consolation to them given that EU law nonetheless has significant effects on 
how they can organize healthcare in practice.  It is clear that the Commission disagrees with the UK 
position on whether or not the NHS functions as a comprehensive sickness insurance provider and, 
as has been shown, excluding all economically inactive migrants from NHS entitlement appears 
impermissible under EU law.  What does that mean for national health services at a time when the 
pressures on healthcare funding are mounting?  Will governments remain willing to operate systems 
like the NHS if many economically inactive EU migrants have a right to access them without 
contributing to host State public finances? 
The only proven manner of putting an end to negative spill-over effects of European integration in 
national healthcare regulation has been to integrate further voluntarily.117  The discussed pull of the 
internal market towards an insurance-based, market-oriented system suggests strongly that it is in 
the Member States’ best interest to legislate on coverage of economically inactive EU citizens sooner 
rather than later.  National health services facing the free movement of all EU citizens can only find 
protection in the further coordination of social security rules at the EU level: in particular, more 
explicit and generally applicable rules allocating responsibility for social security coverage of the 
economically inactive will result in the most effective and equitable solution to the described 
problem,118 if the more radical suggestion to revise Regulation 883/2004 and always make the state 
of residency competent for healthcare services remains politically untenable.119  Nebulous concepts 
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such as a “genuine link” or an “unreasonable burden” are clearly not fully capable of protecting 
systems like the NHS, but that does not mean solutions at the EU level cannot be found.  Establishing 
an EU-level coordinating regime that, for example, requires the home State to provide 
“comprehensive sickness insurance” for economically inactive migrants until they obtain permanent 
residence would not only be more manageable from a domestic administrative perspective, but also 
would result in more security for migrants regardless of how aware they are of their EU rights, and 
would achieve the goal of Regulation 883/2004: no migrants would find themselves without social 
security cover.  Such a five year coverage exclusion is not unprecedented, either: its codification in 
the Citizens’ Directive has assuaged host Member State concerns about being made to pay for 
migrating students.120  More importantly, perhaps, it has become clear that the ECJ will respect such 
a lengthy exception to equal treatment if EU secondary legislation requires it, resulting in far greater 
legal certainty for migrating students and Member States alike.121  Verschueren observes correctly 
that the main shortcoming of the student maintenance exclusion is that the Citizens’ Directive does 
not require the home State to continue providing maintenance aid for students until they achieve 
permanent residence.  Functional coordination would therefore not merely absolve the host State 
from providing an EU citizen’s sickness insurance coverage, but also designate the home State as 
responsible for providing it.122  If student maintenance is any indication, the alternative to EU-level 
legislation is the risk of ongoing litigation before the Court of Justice.123 
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Agreement on more explicit coordination will undoubtedly be an arduous and lengthy process.  
Unlike awaiting what the ECJ might think of the specific requirements in the Citizens’ Directive and 
its interaction with Regulation 883/2004, however, such a legislative solution will allow the Member 
States to give meaning to the fact that they have retained exclusive competence over regulating 
their healthcare systems in the post-citizenship EU. 
